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Introduction
Funded positions, being one of four major types of 
financial transactions, include such diverse forms of 
risk-taking as bank loans, capital market investments, 
and units in collective investment schemes. The basic 
characteristic which they have in common and which 
distinguishes them from other types of financial 
transactions is that they all involve the transfer of 
capital, not only the transfer of risk. Therefore, when 
entering into a funded position – providing a loan 
or buying stock for instance – the risk-taker (bank, 
investor) becomes exposed to the risks via a payment, 
and the risk itself is of losing the invested capital 
(Benjamin, 2007, p. 21).
The goal of entering a funded position by risk-takers 
is certainly receiving income on the invested capital. 
Despite the different forms of the income – interest 
on debt, dividends on shares, appreciation of stock 
value – and different bargaining power of entities 
entering funded positions, ranging from small 
investors to banks, hedge funds, insurers, this main 
objective remains the same. However, regardless of 
this functional similarity, different funded positions 
are regulated differently.
Having different regulations over the course of the 
years seemed reasonable as different transactions 
served different purposes. In recent years, however, 
considering the rapid growth of the financial sector 
in recent decade (Philippon, 2008), more and more 
overlapping business lines (countless examples could 
be quoted here, for instance – in the case of Poland – 
rapidly increasing popularity of individual retirement 
accounts merged with life insurance), a wide stream 
of financial innovations, decentralization (Schwarcz, 
2013) and convergence of funded positions, it 
seems like significant differences in the regulatory 
treatment of varied funded positions are no longer 
justified. Rather, they seem to create regulatory 
arbitrage possibilities, typically available to the most 
sophisticated market agents in particular.
Abstract Regulations treating in a diversified way different types of funded positions introduced over decades, 
do not take into consideration the increasing opportunities of financial innovation and regulatory 
arbitrage. These opportunities seem to significantly benefit the most sophisticated market agents, for 
whom this costly opportunity makes economic sense as they typically engage in gigantic transactions. 
However, the answer to the question of whether such a diversified system of regulations is socially 
desirable seems to be negative.
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This hypothesis is examined in the article. The 
article is structured in the following way: the 
second section serves as a case study of regulations 
of funded positions in the United Kingdom. In 
this section, differences in regulatory treatment of 
funded positions there are described and reasons 
which serve as a rationale behind the particular legal 
solutions are provided. In the third section what led 
to the emergence of these differences is described, 
together with the consequences of their presence 
in the financial laws. In the conclusion, elimination 
of regulatory discrepancies from the regulatory 
treatment of different types of funded positions is 
suggested.
Regulatory differences between 
funded positions
Funded positions, heavily regulated in general, differ 
from each other in such dimensions as fiduciary duty, 
authorization requirements, disclosure agreements, 
promotion regulation, and product regulation 
(Benjamin 2007, p. 219-258). These differences in 
particular relate to the case of the United Kingdom‘s 
regulations, however, their equivalents are similar in 
numerous countries.
Fiduciary duty (obligation of one party – the fiduciary 
– to place the client’s, in this case: investor’s, interests 
above their own) distinguishes equity and managed 
fund investors from debt holders. The former group 
is protected by fiduciary duties of directors (and 
shadow directors) towards the company, in this 
case assimilated to its shareholders as a group, or by 
duties of managed funds‘ managers. Borrowers, on 
the other hand, do not owe fiduciary duties towards 
lending banks (and banks do not either, towards 
their depositors). As fiduciary protections for lenders 
and holders of debt securities do not exist, they may, 
however, replicate them in a contract.
This is understandable when one considers the fact 
that equity holders are owners of a company, which 
makes the company‘s directors – their employees. 
Debt holders, on the other hand, remain outside of 
the structure of the enterprise.
In terms of authorization requirements under the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, managed 
funds differ from both security issuers and borrowers. 
Issuing securities is not a regulated activity, neither is 
borrowing from a bank, yet fund managers generally 
do require authorization as their business is likely 
to involve such regulated activities as managing 
investments, establishing a collective investment 
scheme, dealing with investments as an agent, giving 
investment advice, or arranging deals in investments.
This regulation seems clear when one realizes that 
investors in managed funds have much lower control 
regarding what their capital is invested in, as opposed 
to security holders and lenders who are able to 
choose whom in particular they lend to or in what 
they invest.
As far as disclosure regulation is concerned, the most 
developed regime applies to issuers of securities on 
a regulated market, who are subject to disclosure 
of a prospectus, annual ‘disclosure of disclosures‘, 
periodic financial reports, significant interests in 
shares, and market abuse disclosure requirements. 
Regulated funds are obliged to disclose a prospectus 
and periodic financial reports – both less detailed 
than issuers. Unregulated funds and borrowers 
from banks are not subject to any specific disclosure 
requirements, though banks can – as usual – impose 
certain contractual duties of disclosure on borrowers.
This rule naturally aims at making sure that security 
holders, especially minority shareholders with low 
negotiation power have all relevant information to 
make careful decisions about their investments. The 
negotiation position of banks, which constitute the 
majority of lenders, seems strong enough for them 
to be able to demand any information they desire 
without specific regulation imposed.
The regulation of promotion applies very severely to 
fund units, less so to investment securities, and does 
not exist in relation to bank loans (except for the 
borrower being protected against the lender).
It seems that harsh regulations applied to managed 
funds can be explained in a similar way to authorization 
requirements, and lax regulations regarding lenders 
again by the fact that typical lenders are banks. 
Unlike loans and investment securities, regulated 
funds (but no private funds) are subject to exhaustive 
product regulation, which once again can be 
explained by the ‘indirect‘ manner of investing in 
managed funds.
A few conclusions can be drawn from the analysis 
above. Firstly, lenders – typically banks – seem 
underprotected (none of the fiduciary, authorization, 
disclosure, promotion, product regime protections 
applies to them). On the other hand though, the 
regime for financial collateral and set off in the 
financial markets are more creditor-friendly, 
furthermore banks, being institutions with a strong 
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negotiation position, can replicate regimes of other 
funded positions via contract. Secondly, investors in 
securities are not protected by issuer authorization or 
product regulation, but they benefit from exhaustive 
disclosure regulation and are protected by fiduciary 
duty. Therefore, the regulator makes sure they have 
all the knowledge needed to make a decision about 
investment, yet does not interfere with what their 
capital is invested in. 
It is worth emphasizing that these differences seem 
perfectly understandable if one sticks to the traditional 
understanding of particular funded positions, and so 
considers bank loans, capital market investments, and 
units in collective investment schemes as they were 
decades ago, distinct from each other for example 
in terms of owners of the capital invested. However, 
they seem no longer justified when one takes into 
account financial innovation leading to more and 
more hybrid positions being available on the market. 
Their emergence together with different regulatory 
treatment of funded positions that, in fact, converge, 
creates regulatory arbitrage opportunities which shall 
be analyzed in detail in the next section.
Regulatory arbitrage 
opportunities
Victor Fleischer in his comprehensive article (2010) 
defines regulatory arbitrage as the manipulation 
of the structure of a deal to take advantage of 
the regulatory-regime inconsistency, economic-
substance inconsistency, or time inconsistency of a 
transaction and its regulatory treatment. The analysis 
of uneven regulatory treatment of different funded 
positions deals with inconsistency of economic 
substance. Unlike regulatory regime inconsistency, 
it can take place within a single regulatory regime. 
It means that two transactions with the same or 
significantly similar cash flows receive different 
regulatory treatment. It leads to a regulatory arbitrage 
opportunity of carving up economic cash flows in 
such a way as to reduce regulatory costs via changing 
the formal transaction structure – while changing the 
business deal underneath as little as possible. Certain 
institutions (banks) and transactions seem especially 
prone to regulatory arbitrage – assembling SPVs to 
securitize risky credits in order to take them off a 
bank‘s balance sheet is a recently popular example 
(mentioned by Alan Greenspan already in 1998).
Analysis of the regulatory arbitrage possibilities 
regarding funded positions can be divided into four 
questions: (a) do regulatory arbitrage possibilities 
exist within this group of transactions, (b) is their 
existence merely of historic reasons or is it still 
justifiable, (c) are they equally accessible to all market 
agents, (d) do they create or destroy value for the 
economy. These questions will be addressed below.
As the reader realized going through the second 
section of the article, differences between regulatory 
treatment of loans, debt and equity securities, and 
managed funds, are very significant. Joanna Benjamin 
(2007) argues that this inconsistent and fragmented 
regulation of funded positions was developed in 
response to particular market failures and needs, 
quite often outdated from today’s perspective. For 
example, restrictive scheme promotion regulation 
which applies only to private funds and is not reflected 
in any other European jurisdiction except for the UK 
dates back to 1930 and was supposed to protect small 
investors in funds from salesmen’s pressure. It did 
not apply to securities because small investors were 
not buying them back then (Benjamin, 2007, p. 252-
253). If the protective rationale is still valid, security 
investors should be protected by this regulation, too, 
as investing in securities is no longer a prerogative of 
institutional investors and very wealthy individuals.
This brings the issue of law construction in general: as 
law constructed in 1930 reflected the market situation 
back then, should today’s law – since it is impossible 
for law to be universal, regardless of the times – reflect 
the current situation on the markets, with increasing 
convergence of funded positions? Differences 
between „overdeveloped“ securities regulation and 
bank regulation were emphasized by Wood already in 
1995, yet increasing convergence makes them more 
and more dangerous. Joanna Benjamin (2007, p. 257-
258) mentions the example of a company X wishing 
to raise capital from Y, which can choose different 
structures of the funded position, such as issuing 
securities directly or placing them in a private fund, 
converting fund units into bonds.
Another interesting example are Eurobonds 
(therefore, securities) as opposed to syndicated loans. 
Both are similar functionally (or are ‘close economic 
substitutes‘), with a syndicate of investment banks 
providing capital and taking the borrower’s credit 
risk, yet the bonds are emitted to investors from 
outside the banks, though the banks agree to buy 
any remaining bonds themselves (Benjamin, 2007, p. 
181-182). Due to regulatory discrepancies mentioned 
in the second section, bondholders are more 
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protected than borrowers in international syndicated 
loan markets, even though differences between 
them in respect of patterns of holding, repetition 
of advances, underwriting (Hughes, 2006), and 
liquidity (Bowles & Fox, 2007), are narrowing. This is 
a bright example of regulatory arbitrage: functionally 
similar syndicated loans and Eurobonds are treated 
differently by regulators. Interestingly, more and 
more often borrowers seeking urgent funding turn 
to hedge funds rather than banks for loans (it is 
estimated that hedge funds represent currently more 
than half of the money invested in the leveraged loan 
market; Bowles & Fox, 2007), exploiting regulatory 
differences between the two.
Regulatory arbitrage is a costly activity as engaging 
in it is possible only with the support of professional 
lawyers. Typically, only large companies can afford 
employing elite law firms to arrange more aggressive 
deal structures which, as Fleischer put it, „push 
the regulatory frontier“, and corporations with 
established political connections are more effective in 
bargaining over the regulatory treatment of a deal. As 
data shows (Fleischer, 2010, p. 230), well-established 
corporations with strong governance structure do 
engage in more aggressive regulatory planning than 
start-ups or closely held firms. As argued by Fleischer 
(2010) and Knoll (2005), this makes the existence 
of regulatory arbitrage opportunities unfair, as only 
the „rich, sophisticated, well-advised, and politically 
connected“ parties are able to avoid regulatory 
burdens which the rest of the society is unable to 
do. Therefore, the rest of the society pays the higher 
regulatory cost, which seems against the rule of social 
justice.
Regulatory arbitrage can take the form of using 
ready-made financial instruments or, more and more 
frequently recently, of financial innovation. With 
the development of financial engineering and ease 
of repackaging cash flow streams in order to create 
hybrid instruments, the classical division of funded 
positions, as described in the second section of the 
article and as addressed by regulations, is no longer 
valid (Knoll, 2005, p. 64). As argued by Smith & 
Smithson already in 1990, among the major reasons 
for financial innovation activities one should mention 
inconsistencies of the regulatory and tax regimes. 
As added by Miller (1991), these two can be even 
described as a primary reason for innovating.
It can be argued that financial innovation is positive for 
the economy in that sense that it responds to market 
needs by creating new, tailored financial instruments. 
However, these instruments are largely unregulated 
or regulated in a way which is not suitable for them, 
and, as mentioned above, rather than responding to 
market needs, they serve as a means of regulatory 
arbitrage by making it possible for institutions to evade 
financial regulation by creating positions prohibited, 
or at least discouraged, by regulators. Obviously 
financial innovation is a revenue-generating activity 
for the parties involved – had this not been the case, 
entities would not undertake it. The question arises, 
however, of whether existence of these lucrative 
opportunities and the regulatory arbitrage they lead 
to is efficient from the society’s point of view, whose 
welfare should be the main focus of law makers. 
The answer seems to be negative – the extra benefits 
earned by parties involved in financial innovation 
and regulatory arbitrage are obviously reflected in 
relatively higher burdens transferred onto those tax 
payers who do not make use of regulatory arbitrage. 
It makes the existence of regulatory arbitrage, as 
Fleischer (2010, p. 234) puts it, „privately beneficial 
and socially wasteful”, even though, according to 
him, without further investigation it is not correct to 
claim that a particular arbitrage technique is socially 
positive or negative. If the regulation is, for example, 
generally poor, and driven by particular interest 
groups, regulatory arbitrage opportunities which 
other parties can exploit might increase social welfare. 
However, if one sticks to the objective of having 
good and fair laws, it can be argued that regulatory 
arbitrage opportunities should be excluded from the 
landscape.
Conclusions
Funded positions vary, and so does – in many 
aspects – their regulatory treatment, which seems 
understandable when one ignores the transactions‘ 
convergence and the increasing presence of financial 
engineering. However, taking those into account one 
must agree that the regulatory discrepancies lead to 
opportunities of financial arbitrage, which, as argued 
by many, are unjust – as typically sophisticated 
market participants exploit them at the cost of 
the rest of the society which is unable to avoid the 
regulatory burden. According to Fleischer (2010, p. 
229), regulatory arbitrage opportunities „undermine 
the efficiency of regulatory competition, shift the 
incidence of regulatory costs, and foster a lack of 
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transparency and accountability that undermines the 
rule of law”, which makes them undesirable.
What should be emphasized, however, is that 
these regulatory arbitrage opportunities were not 
too significant a couple of decades ago, when the 
regulations were written. However, as times change, 
people invest in different assets than they used to (e.g. 
individuals now do buy securities), new instruments 
enter the market, etc. The sometimes outdated 
law, which is still in place, rather than protecting 
weak market agents, attributes more power to the 
already strong agents, who are able to take further 
advantage of the regulatory arbitrage. As this state 
is undesirable, regulatory arbitrage opportunities 
should be eliminated. Revising the law and creating 
rules which more precisely address the current 
situation is necessary, though difficult. Ways to solve 
the issue would include focusing more on parties, 
rather than transactions themselves, and/or using 
wider legal definitions that would automatically 
address new financial instruments. Whichever way 
is chosen to approach the problem of inconsistencies 
in legal treatment of similar financial transactions, it 
seems desirable to rule them out of the financial laws.
References
Benjamin, J. (2007). Financial Law. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Bowles, S., Fox, D. (2007). Credit Markets and Market 
Abuse. Journal of International Banking & Financial Law.
Fleischer, V. (2010). Regulatory Arbitrage. University of 
Colorado Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 
10-11, p. 227-289.
Greenspan, A. (1998). The Role of Capital in Optimal 
Banking Supervision and Regulation. FRBNY Economic 
Policy Review, October, p. 163-168.
Hughes, M. (2006). Legal Principles in Banking and 
Structured Finance. Tottel Publishing. 2nd edition. 
Knoll, M. S. (2005). Regulatory Arbitrage using Put-Call 
Parity. Journal of Applied Finance, Vol. 15, No. 1, Spring/
Summer 2005.
Miller, M. H. (1991). Financial Innovations And Market 
Volatility. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, p. 5-9.
Philippon, T. (2008). The Evolution of the US Financial 
Industry from 1860 to 2007: Theory and Evidence. NYU 
working paper.
Schwarcz S. (2013). Framing Address: A Framework for 
Analyzing Financial Market Transformation. 36 Seattle U. 
L. Rev. 299.
Smith, C. W., Smithson, Ch. W. (1990). Financial 
Engineering: An Overview. The Handbook of Financial 
Engineering, New York, NY, Harper Business.
Wood, P. (1995). International Loans, Bonds and Securities 
Regulation. London: Sweet & Maxwell, p. 11.
Małgorzata Karaś, UNEVEN REGULATORY TREATMENT OF DIFFERENT FUNDED POSITIONS – REGULATORY ARBITRAGE OPPORTUNITY?,
48-52